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EMPLOYEE CHALLENGES TO ARBITRAL AWARDS:
A MODEL FOR PROTECTING INDIVIDUAL
RIGHTS UNDER THE COLLECTIVE
BARGAINING AGREEMENT
In May of 1969, Michael Holodnak was discharged from a
division of the Avco Corporation for publishing an article critical
of the company and his union, the United Auto Workers of
America (UAW).1 Holodnak challenged his discharge by filing a
grievance that the union processed through the contractual
grievance procedure and ultimately submitted to arbitration. At
his own request, Holodnak was represented at the arbitration
hearing by a union attorney rather than by the union commit-
teeman who usually handled such proceedings. The attorney,
however, had neither met with Holodnak nor read his article
prior to the hearing. He failed to challenge the discharge on
readily available grounds of attack; for example, he never intro-
duced into evidence more vituperative articles for which other
employee-authors had apparently not been disciplined.2 During
the hearing, the arbitrator asked Holodnak numerous "offen-
sive" and "irrelevant" questions about his social and political be-
Holodnak v. Avco Corp., 381 F. Supp. 191, 195 (D. Conn. 1974), aff'd in part and
rev'd in part, 514 F.2d 285 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 892 (1975). Holodnak was
discharged for having violated plant conduct rule 19, which prohibited the making of
"false, vicious or malicious statements concerning any employee or which affect the
employee's relationship to his job, his supervisors, or the Company's products, property,
reputation, or good will in the community." Id. at 194-95.
2 Id. at 196-97. The federal district court for the District of Connecticut, which heard
Holodnak's subsequent challenge to the arbitral award, suggested that the union attorney
was lackadaisical in pressing several additional defenses; he argued only briefly that the
maliciousness or untruth of Holodnak's article was not established by any evidence, and
he did not press the contention that Avco had waived any right to discharge an employee
for violating rule 19. See id. at 197.
The district court also addressed itself to Holodnak's claim that the company's action
deprived him of the right to free speech-a claim unique to Holodnak's factual situation
because Avco was a major defense contractor whose land, buildings and equipment were
owned in large part by the United States government. The district court found sufficient
governmental action to invoke first amendment protections, but it interpreted those
protections to require only that the "discharge for just cause" provision of the collective
agreement be read to prohibit discharge for exercising the right of free speech. Thus,
Holodnak's claim against Avco was considered by the district court solely as an action for
breach of contract; the court did not address the issue of whether a civil damage action
could be prosecuted to remedy a first amendment violation. Id. at 201-04 & n.12.
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liefs and seemed intent throughout on "instructing Holodnak on
the mistake of his ways."3 The union attorney raised no objec-
tions to the arbitrator's questions and comments, and his post-
hearing brief characterized the grievant as a naive man of "su-
perficial knowledge" who "really knew not what he was doing."
4
Not surprisingly, Holodnak's discharge was upheld by the arbi-
trator.
Although Holodnak presents a particularly compelling ex-
ample of the need to protect the rights of individual employees
under collective bargaining agreements, 5 the outcome of the case
is relatively unusual both because the individual was allowed to
challenge the award on grounds usually .reserved to the collective
parties, 6 and because he was ultimately successful in his chal-
3 1d. at 196. The arbitrator was the permanent arbitrator between Avco and the
UAW local, and he had also been criticized in Holodnak's article. Id. at 195, 199.
4 Id. at 197 (quoting post-arbitration brief filed on Holodnak's behalf).
5 The distinction between individual and collective rights under the collective bar-
gaining agreement was articulated in Association of Westinghouse Salaried Employees v.
Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 348 U.S. 437 (1955), in which the Supreme Court charac-
terized individual rights as "peculiar in the individual benefit which is their subject
matter," id. at 460, "uniquely personal," id. at 461 (Warren, C.J., concurring), arising
"from separate hiring contracts between the employer and each employee," id. at 464
(Reed, J., concurring). The Court in Smith v. Evening News Ass'n, 371 U.S. 195 (1962),
cited rates of pay, hours of work, and protection from wrongful discharge as examples of
individual rights under the contract. See id. at 199. In contrast, collective rights are those
relating to "broad policy issues" and belonging to "the bargaining unit as a whole"; these
rights include the right to demand discussion of such issues as renegotiation of the
contract or relocation of the plant. Brown v. Sterling Aluminum Prods. Corp., 365 F.2d
651, 657 (8th Cir. 1966).
Individual standing to challenge an arbitration award should be afforded to em-
ployees whose individual rights are effectively adjudicated in the arbitral proceeding,
regardless of whether the challenging employee was a named grievant in that proceed-
ing. This concept of standing is desirable because the adjudication of another's contrac-
tual rights may effectively preclude an employee's assertion of a contrary position con-
cerning his own rights under the contract. For example, in a seniority dispute one
employee may successfully claim at arbitration that he should be given a certain seniority
ranking; some employees who were previously more senior than the grievant now find
themselves ranked below him. Although the rules of res judicata and collateral estoppel
will not bind an employee who was not a party to the original grievance, neither the
union nor another arbitrator would be inclined to upset the prior resolution. The union
believes that it has the right to choose which employees to support in a seniority dispute,
and the new arbitrator would probably value the peace and predictability a final resolu-
tion brings to the seniority system. Because the employees whose seniority was di-
minished have had their rights adversely determined, they should have standing to
challenge the initial award.
6 Although the district court in Holodnak permitted the plaintiff to attack the arbit-
ration award under the United States Arbitration Act, 9 U.S.C. § 10 (1970), on the basis
of the arbitrator's errors, this procedure is not ordinarily available to individual em-
ployees. 381 F. Supp. at 198-99. See also text accompanying notes 77-84 infra.
Holodnak's complaint in federal district court also alleged that Avco had breached the
collective bargaining agreement and that the union had violated its duty of fair rep-
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lenge. An individual generally faces grave difficulties in attack-
ing an arbitral award when the union has failed to represent him
adequately,' and he has even less chance of success when he
wishes to base his challenge solely on arbitral misconduct. The
task of challenging an arbitral award, and thereby vindicating an
employee's underlying contractual claim against the employer, is
onerous because an individual whose contract claim against his
employer has been denied by an arbitrator must attack the
award in the context of a suit against his union for breach of its
duty of fair representation. This threshold showing of unfair
representation is required, even though the arbitrator's errors
may have independently tainted the award's validity, because
only the collective parties-the employer or the union-may as-
sert arbitral error as the basis for attacking an award. Thus, the
individual employee is effectively put to the unpleasant choice of
foregoing his rights under the collective agreement or of an-
tagonizing his union by alleging its misconduct, even when that
union may be absolutely or relatively blameless.
8
Employee challenges to arbitral awards are substantially dif-
ferent from employer and union challenges in both the stan-
dards and procedures applicable to these actions. The allegations
of a fair representation suit are evaluated to determine whether
the union's representation has been discriminatory, perfunctory,
or arbitrary.9 If the individual employee can prove unfair rep-
resentation, the merits of his underlying grievance will then
be heard and adjudicated by a court. ' Challenges to arbitral
resentation. 381 F. Supp. at 194; see note 7 infra. The district court granted relief on all
three claims: the arbitration award was vacated under the Arbitration Act, back-pay and
punitive damages were assessed against Avco under § 301 of the Labor Management
Relations Act, 29 U.S.C. § 185 (1970), 381 F. Supp. at 199, 204-06, and the union was
held to have breached its duty of fair representation by handling Holodnak's grievance
in a perfunctory manner, id. at 199-201. The court, however, ruled without amplifica-
tion that the entire loss suffered by Holodnak was due to his improper discharge by the
employer, and it therefore imposed no damages on the union, id. at 205. On appeal,
the Second Circuit affirmed the district court's opinion in all respects other than on the
issue of punitive damages, devoting most of its opinion to a discussion of the state
-action question as it related to the first amendment issue. See generally Holodnak v.
Avco Corp., 514 F.2d 285 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 892 (1975).
'See Tobias, Individual Employee Suits for Breach of the Labor Agreement and the Union's
Duty of Fair Representation, 5 U. TOL. L. REv. 514 (1974). The duty of fair representa-
tion extends to the grievance-arbitration procedure to the extent that a union "may not
arbitrarily ignore a meritorious grievance or process it in a perfunctory fashion." Vaca
v. Sipes, 386 U.S. 171, 191 (1967).
8 See text accompanying notes 64-66 infra.
'Vaca v. Sipes, 386 U.S. 171, 190 (1967).
10 As a practical matter, the fair representation and contract actions will be litigated
simultaneously, and evidence admitted by the court will be considered with respect to
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awards by employers and unions, by comparison, must meet ob-
jective standards for showing procedural and substantive error
by the arbitrator. In cases where such error can be proven suc-
cessfully, the award is ordinarily vacated and the case is re-
manded for rearbitration. 11
This Comment suggests that the fair representation suit is
an unsatisfactory method for challenging arbitral awards because
it creates strained relationships between the union and its mem-
bers and leads to the surrender of individual rights under the
collective agreement, and because it is inconsistent with the in-
tegrity of the arbitral process. After reviewing the sources of
these problems, this Comment suggests that conflicts among the
competing interests in this area could be alleviated: (1) by giving
individual employees a right to appeal arbitral awards on all
grounds now available to the employer or to the union, (2) by
treating a breach of the duty of fair representation as an addi-
tional ground for challenging the award, to be proven without
disposing of the merits of the underlying grievance, and (3) by
limiting relief to vacating the award and remanding the griev-
ance for rearbitration.
I. EMPLOYER AND UNION CHALLENGES TO
ARBITRAL AWARDS
Judicial intervention in the arbitral process is based upon
section 301 of the Labor Management Relations Act (LMRA)
giving the federal courts jurisdiction to enforce the contractual
promise to arbitrate.' 2 In the Steelworkers Trilogy, 3 the Supreme
Court expressed a strong preference for the finality of arbitral
either, or both, of the plaintiff's claims. See, e.g., Petersen v. Rath Packing Co., 461 F.2d
312 (8th Cir. 1972); Steinmane v. Spector Freight Sys., Inc., 441 F.2d 599 (2d Cir.
1971).
11 See text accompanying notes 39-41 infra.
12 Section 301 of the LMRA gives the federal courts greater jurisdiction than en-
forcement of particular arbitration clauses. 29 U.S.C. § 185 (1970). In Textile Workers
Union v. Lincoln Mills, 353 U.S. 448 (1957), the Supreme Court held that § 301(a)
required the federal courts to create a body of federal common law applicable to the
enforcement of collective agreements in general. Id. at 456-57. In Avco Corp. v. Aero
Lodge No. 735, Int'l Ass'n of Machinists, 390 U.S. 557 (1968), the Court held that an
action arising under § 301(a) to enforce a collective agreement clause is controlled by
federal substantive law as fashioned under Lincoln Mills, even if the suit is brought in
state court. Id. at 560.
13 The Steelworkers Trilogy consisted of three cases involving arbitrations in which
the United Steelworkers of America was a party: United Steelworkers v. Enterprise
Wheel & Car Corp., 363 U.S. 593 (1960); United Steelworkers v. Warrior & Gulf
Navigation Co., 363 U.S. 574 (1960); United Steelworkers v. American Mfg. Co., 363
U.S. 564 (1960). Mr. Justice Douglas wrote the majority opinion in all three cases.
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awards in the area of labor relations and stated that "[t]he re-
fusal of courts to review the merits of an arbitration award is
the proper approach to arbitration under collective bargaining
agreements. The federal policy of settling labor disputes by ar-
bitration would be undermined if courts had the final say on the
merits of the awards."'14 The Court noted that the source of this
federal policy is section 203(d) of the LMRA, which states: "Final
adjustment by a method agreed upon by the parties is hereby
decared to be the desirable method for settlement of grievance
disputes arising over the application or interpretation of an exist-
ing collective-bargaining agreement .... "15 The policy favoring
finality seeks first to protect the integrity of the arbitration pro-
cess that is vital to the system of self-government established
under the collective agreement, and second to avoid the substi-
tution of a court's interpretation of the contract for the informed
judgment of an arbitrator who is familiar with "the common law
of the shop" and can construe the broadly-drawn language of
the collective agreement.'
6
The Steelworkers Trilogy anticipates that the scope of judicial
intervention in the arbitral process should be limited to deciding
whether the party objecting to the award had agreed both to
arbitrate the grievance and to give the arbitrator the authority to
make the resulting award. 17 That the Court did not anticipate
absolute finality of arbitral awards, however, is evident in its
discussion of the grounds for vacating an award:
Nevertheless, an arbitrator is confined to interpretation
and application of the collective bargaining agreement;
he does not sit to dispense his own brand of industrial
justice. He may of course look for guidance from many
sources, yet his award is legitimate only so long as it
draws its essence from the collective bargaining agree-
ment. When the arbitrator's words manifest an infidel-
ity to this obligation, courts have no choice but to refuse
enforcement of the award.1 8
Judicial efforts to develop uniform standards for vacating
labor arbitration awards reflect this paucity of Supreme Court
14 United Steelworkers v. Enterprise Wheel & Car Corp., 363 U.S. 593, 596 (1960).
15 United Steelworkers v. American Mfg. Co., 363 U.S. 564, 566 (1960), quoting 29
U.S.C. § 173(d) (1947).
16 United Steelworkers v. Warrior & Gulf Navigation Co., 363 U.S. 574, 581-82
(1960).
17Id. at 582-83.
18 United Steelworkers v. Enterprise Wheel & Car Corp., 363 U.S. 593, 597 (1960).
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guidance. In dealing with challenges to arbitral awards,' 9 the
courts have looked not only to the general language of the
Steelworkers Trilogy, but also to such diverse sources of federal
substantive law as the United States Arbitration Act,
20 state law,2 1
and the standards of review used by the National Labor Rela-
tions Board.22
The ambiguous teachings of the cases and statutes have
produced two broad grounds for challenging arbitral awards.
2 3
First, the award may be challenged on substantive grounds if the
arbitrator has clearly exceeded the scope of his authority. Such
overreaching may be found when an award orders an act that is
illegal2 4 or violative of public policy. 25 Abuse of authority may
also be found if the award is shown to be inconsistent with the
clear provisions of the collective bargaining agreement. The
Steelworkers Trilogy gives great latitude to the arbitrator in inter-
preting contractual provisions because his interpretation, based
on his knowledge of the common law of the shop, is viewed as
one of the benefits of the contracting parties' bargain.26 An
award, however, may be vacated on the ground that its essence
is drawn from outside the collective agreement27 when the ar-
bitrator's interpretation of a provision of the collective agree-
ment is clearly unwarranted in view of the parties' past dealings,
28
or when the arbitrator has made an award that is patently incon-
sistent with the terms of the contract.2 9 Some courts will also find
"9See note 12 supra.
20 Act of July 30, 1947, Pub. L. No. 80-282, 61 Stat. 669 (codified at 9 U.S.C.
§§ 1-14 (1970)).
2'1 See, e.g., Ludwig Honold Mfg. Co. v. Fletcher, 405 F.2d 1123 (3d Cir. 1969).
22 The weight given to each source varies with the identities of the parties, the
nature of the controversy, and the views of a particular court with respect to the ap-
plicability of the law in the context of labor arbitrations; each source nevertheless has
contributed to the body of decisional law, at least by way of analogy. For a discussion of
the sources of federal substantive law under § 301 of the LMRA, see Comment,Judicial
Deference to Arbitral Determinations: Continuing Problems of Power and Finality, 23 U.C.L.A.
L. REV. 936, 950-55 (1976).
23 See generally id. 956-62; Note, Labor Arbitration: Appealing the Procedural Decisions of
Arbitrators, 59 MINN. L. REv. 109, 139-52 (1974).
24 See Glendale Mfg. Co. v. Local 520, ILGWU, 283 F.2d 936 (4th Cir. 1960), cert.
denied, 366 U.S. 950 (1961).
25 Black v. Cutter Laboratories, 43 Cal. 2d 788, 278 P.2d 905 (1955) (applying state
law), cert. dismissed, 351 U.S. 292 (1956).
26 See United Steelworkers v. Warrior & Gulf Navigation Co., 363 U.S. 574, 581-82
(1960).
27 United Steelworkers v. Enterprise Wheel & Car Corp., 363 U.S. 593, 597 (1960)
(dictum).28See, e.g., Torrington Co. v. Metal Prod. Workers Local 1645, 362 F.2d 677,
681-82 (2d Cir. 1966).29 See, e.g., H.K. Porter Co. v. United Saw, File & Steel Prod. Workers, 333 F.2d
596, 602 (3d Cir. 1964).
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substantive error in an arbitration decision that is so palpably
faulty and outrageous as to shock the conscience of the court.
30
The second ground for overturning an award involves pro-
cedural error by the arbitrator that deprives the challenging
party of the right to a fair h~aring.3 1 This right operates as one
of the few restraints imposed by courts on the otherwise flexible
and informal hearing procedure traditionally associated with
arbitrations; 32 standards of due process require courts to over-
turn awards tainted by fraud, corruption or partiality. Similar
concepts of procedural fairness are embodied in the United
States Arbitration Act's provisions, which allow the vacating of
an award when it was procured by corruption, fraud, or undue
means, when the arbitrator was evidently partial or corrupt, or
when the arbitrator was guilty of such misconduct as the refusal
to hear material evidence or to grant reasonable postpone-
ments. 3 When an employer or the union seeks to overturn an
award on any of these procedural grounds, the challenging party
may be thwarted by the finality principle if the procedural defect
does not clearly taint the outcome of the hearing or if the defect
concerns a decision by the arbitrator that the court holds to be
within his discretion. The arbitrator's discretion is given great
deference by the courts because the parties have contracted for
his binding decisions on procedural matters and because courts
view informality as a positive attribute of the arbitral system.
3 4
As a result of the Supreme Court's insistence in the Steel-
workers Trilogy that judges must not review the merits of an
award and that enforcement should be granted unless the
3, See Safeway Stores v. American Bakery Workers Local 111, 390 F.2d 79, 82 (5th
Cir. 1968) (dictum). For a summary of the various standards used by courts in deciding
whether to disturb an award on the ground of substantive error, see Ludwig Honold
Mfg. Co. v. Fletcher, 405 F.2d 1123, 1126 (3d Cir. 1969). The court in Ludwig Honold
concluded:
[A] labor arbitrator's award does "draw its essence from the collective bargain-
ing agreement" if the interpretation can in any rational way be derived from
the agreement, viewed in the light of its language, its context, and any other
indicia of the parties' intention; only where there is a manifest disregard of the
agreement, totally unsupported by principles of contract construction and the
law of the shop, may a reviewing court disturb the award.
Id. at 1128 (footnote omitted).
3, Courts derive this right from the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment.
See Note, supra note 23, at 145-47.
32 See Jaffe, Labor Arbitration and the Individual Worker, 287 ANNALS 34, 40 (May
1953). See generally Commonwealth Coatings Corp. v. Continental Cas. Co., 393 U.S.
145 (1968) (commercial arbitration case); Harvey Aluminum (Inc.) v. United Steel-
workers, 263 F. Supp. 488 (C.D. Cal. 1967).
33 9 U.S.C. § 10(a)-(c) (1970).
34 See Note, supra note 23, at 148-49.
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arbitrator's decision was inconsistent with the explicit dictates of
the collective bargaining agreement,35 judicial review is limited
to ascertaining whether the arbitrator acted within the parame-
ters of his authority and granted both parties a fair hearing. As
in an appeal, a court's inquiry focuses primarily on the record of
the arbitration below, and it treats the use and admissibility of
evidence very differently than if it were hearing the merits of the
original controversy. Although the court may consider evidence
pertaining to the merits of the grievance, this evidence will be
relevant only to the limited question whether grounds exist for
overturning the award. In an employer or union challenge based
on procedural unfairness, for example, evidence that eyewitness
testimony was excluded by an arbitrator will be significant not
because the evidence necessarily vindicates the challenging
party's position, but because the exclusion demonstrates the
arbitrator's partiality. 36 When an award is challenged on substan-
tive grounds, the court will ordinarily examine the collective
bargaining agreement and the evidence of past practices be-
tween the employer and the union to determine whether the
arbitrator's award drew its essence from the contract.37 Although
the court's decision to vacate an award on the basis of substantive
error may effectively adjudicate the merits of a case,38 the review
does not involve a relitigation of the issues presented at the
arbitration. A reviewing court will only consider evidence that
was or could readily have been available to the arbitrator, and it
will vacate the award and remand the grievance for rearbitration
rather than undertake a full-scale inquiry into the merits of the
underlying grievance.
39
This procedure of remanding for rearbitration is consistent
with the federal policy of encouraging internal resolution of
labor-management disputes. If the employer and the union have
'5 See United Steelworkers v. Warrior & Gulf Navigation Co., 363 U.S. 574, 581-82
(1960) (review of the merits); United Steelworkers v. Enterprise Wheel & Car Corp.,
363 U.S. 593, 597 (1960) (enforcement of the award).
36 Harvey Aluminum (Inc.) v. United Steelworkers, 263 F. Supp. 488, 493, 495
(C.D. Cal. 1967). The evidence must be material and its exclusion prejudicial. See
Newark Stereotypers Local 18 v. Newark Morning Ledger Co., 397 F.2d 594, 599 (3d
Cir.), cert. denied, 393 U.S. 954 (1968); 9 U.S.C. § 10(c) (1970). Therefore, the court
must examine the merits sufficiently to decide whether a reasonable arbitrator's deci-
sion might have been affected by the excluded evidence.
" Torrington Co. v. Metal Prod. Workers Local 1645, 362 F.2d 677, 680 (2d Cir.
1966).
"See note 75 infra.
3 9 See, e.g., Glendale Mfg. Co. v. Local 520, ILGWU, 283 F.2d 936 (4th Cir. 1960),
cert. denied, 366 U.S. 950 (1961); Harvey Aluminum (Inc.) v. United Steelworkers, 263
F. Supp. 488 (C.D. Cal. 1967).
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indeed bargained for the informed judgment of an arbitrator,
they are ultimately entitled to this method of resolving their
disputes, and they should not be compelled to submit their con-
troversy to a judge who "cannot be expected to bring the same
experience and competence to bear upon the determination of
a grievance, simply because he cannot be similarly informed. 40
The law concerning attacks on arbitral awards by the em-
ployer or the union is thus pervaded by the judicial preference
for finality of these awards.41 Treatment of such challenges is
characterized by narrowly drawn grounds upon which to over-
turn an award, by a focus on misconduct or gross error of the
arbitrator, and by a limited scope of review that gives great def-
erence to the arbitrator's judgment. When an award is vacated,
rearbitration is usually ordered. In an individual's challenge to
the arbitral process through a fair representation suit, quite dif-
ferent procedural and analytical considerations are involved.
II. EMPLOYEE CHALLENGES TO THE ARBITRATION PROCESS:
THE PRE-ARBITRAL CONTEXT
An attack on a labor arbitration award that is based solely
on the arbitrator's errors is ordinarily available only to dissatis-
fied employers and unions. 42 The individual grievant who wishes
to challenge the award-either because he believes the arbitrator
was substantively or procedurally in error, or because he feels his
union failed to represent him adequately-must follow an en-
tirely different procedure in order to vindicate his underlying
contract claim against the employer.
Although courts have disagreed over the proper procedure
to be followed, the Supreme Court in Smith v. Evening News
Association43 held that the individual employee can sue his em-
ployer under section 301(a) of the LMRA in order to enforce his
rights under the collective agreement. No mandatory arbitration
clause existed, however, in the collective agreement involved in
Smith. The presence of such a clause in the contract was crucial
to the Supreme Court's later holding in Republic Steel Corp. v.
Maddox44 that "federal labor policy requires that individual em-
4" United Steelworkers v. Warrior & Gulf Navigation Co., 363 U.S. 574, 582 (1960).
41 See, e.g, Saxis S.S. Co. v. Multifacs Int'l Traders, Inc., 375 F.2d 577, 583 (2d Cir.
1967) (a commercial arbitration). The Arbitration Act does permit the court to modify
an award on limited grounds that do not involve a review of the merits of the con-
troversy. 9 U.S.C. § 11 (1970).
" See text accompanying notes 77-84 infra.
'3 371 U.S. 195, 200-01 (1962).
4379 U.S. 650 (1965).
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ployees wishing to assert contract grievances must attempt use of
the contract grievance procedure agreed upon by the employer
and union as the mode of redress. '45 The Maddox doctrine that
an individual must exhaust his remedies under the internal pro-
cedure has been consistently applied in cases where the collective
agreement contains an arbitration clause.46 It has operated to
require an employee to look initially to his union for vindication
of contractual rights before suing the employer under section
301(a).
47
The Maddox Court offered four arguments to justify impos-
ing the exhaustion of remedies requirement in labor arbitration:
(1) the union has an interest in controlling the processing of
employee grievances because this activity complements the
union's status as the unit's exclusive bargaining representative;
(2) exclusive control over grievances will enhance the union's
status in the eyes of the employees; (3) an employer may wish to
limit the number of procedures available to employees who seek
to redress alleged breaches of the collective agreement; and (4)
an employee should at least attempt to use the grievance proce-
dure before asserting that it is inadequate.48 The Maddox hold-
ing, however, failed to address a vital concern of the individual
employee: if he was dependent upon the union to enforce his
contractual rights, the employee needed some guarantee that the
union would exert a good faith effort to vindicate those rights
through the grievance procedure. Protection of this interest was
clearly afforded in Vaca v. Sipes,49 which confirmed that the
union was under a duty to represent the employee fairly during
the grievance procedure and which provided for redress of the
employee's underlying contract claim under section 301(a) when
the union breached its duty.
Vaca involved an employee whose union refused to process
his grievance beyond the fourth step of the contractual proce-
dure, thereby depriving the grievant of a hearing before an
arbitrator." The Court held that a wrongful refusal to submit
the grievance to arbitration constituted a breach of the union's
duty of fair representation that would excuse the employee's
451 d. at 652 (emphasis in original) (footnote omitted).
46 See Boone v. Armstrong Cork Co., 384 F.2d 285 (5th Cir. 1967); Belk v. Allied
Aviation Serv. Co., 315 F.2d 513, 516 n.3 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 375 U.S. 847 (1963)
(citing cases).
47 315 F.2d at 516 (footnote omitted).
48 379 U.S. at 653.
49 386 U.S. 171 (1967).
5 0 Id. at 174-76.
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failure to exhaust his remedies under the contract. 5' Vaca thus
addressed one exception to the exhaustion rule by permitting
the employee to sue under section 301(a) when the union's
breach of duty had made the grievance procedure substantially
unavailable to the individual and ineffective to protect his con-
tractual claim.52 Vaca required a showing of unfair representa-
tion to be measured by the principles of federal law concerning a
union's duty to individual employees, 53 but the Court's opinion
did little to clarify the definition of unfairness. To the require-
ment that all employees be represented in good faith and with-
out hostile and invidious discrimination, 54 Vaca added only that a
union may not arbitrarily ignore a meritorious grievance or pro-
cess it in a perfunctory manner.5 5 Under Vaca a threshold show-
ing of unfair representation is a precondition of standing to
pursue the contract claim under section 301(a) in order to ex-
cuse the failure to exhaust contractual remedies. The Vaca Court
followed Maddox in reasoning that the individual employee
should at least attempt to exhaust the exclusive grievance and
arbitration procedures established by the collective bargaining
agreement before seeking redress in the courts.
Once established, a breach of the duty gives rise to union
liability for that portion of the employee's damages caused by the
union's unfair representation. Because the union's liability is
premised on its prolongation or exacerbation of the employer's
initial wrong, that wrong must also be proved.56 In practice, both
the union and the employer are usually joined as defendants in
a single suit, and the court adjudicates the employee's claims
against both in the same proceeding. 57 The employer cannot
shield himself from liability for breach of contract by proving the
union's unfair representation, 58 and in fact both defendants
often assert each other's lack of wrongdoing as a defense to their
own alleged misconduct.
59
" Vaca specifically rejected the theory that an employee has an absolute right to
have his grievance taken to arbitration. Discretion was left in the hands of the union to
decide fairly whether to settle grievances prior to arbitration. Id. at 191. But see id. at
204-08 (Black, J., dissenting). See generally Summers, Individual Rights in Collective Bar-
gaining Agreements and Arbitration, 37 N.Y.U. L. REV. 562 (1962).
52 386 U.S. at 185-86.
5 See generally id. at 188-95.
4 See Ford Motor Co. v. Huffman, 345 U.S. 330 (1953).
55 386 U.S. at 190.
5 See id. at 185, 197.
5 See note 10supra.
"See 386 U.S. at 185.
5 9 See id. at 210 (Black, J., dissenting).
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The Supreme Court in Vaca did not mandate this procedure
of joining defendants and litigating both issues in a single pro-
ceeding, nor did it require a court to remedy an alleged breach
of contract rather than to order the parties to arbitration. ° On
one hand, Vaca acknowledged that arbitration is the employee's
coritractual procedure for remedying a breach by the employer
of the collective agreement, 6I and that the employee is entitled to
the procedure for which the union, as his representative, has
bargained. On the other hand, the Court asserted that arbitra-
tion should not be ordered in all cases, because an arbitrator
"may have no power under the [collective] bargaining agreement
to award . . .damages against the union. ' 62 A more compelling
rationale for a court's unwillingness to order arbitration after
making a finding of unfair representation may be that the fair-
ness of the arbitral proceeding cannot be guaranteed when the
union's good faith has been so seriously questioned. Although
this consideration may be paramount in the pre-arbitral cases,
whether it is applicable in the post-award context must be care-
fully examined.
III. A MODEL FOR EMPLOYEE CHALLENGES TO
ARBITRATION AWARDS
When an arbitrator considers and rejects an individual's
grievance, the individual may feel that the decision is incorrect
because the arbitrator committed substantive or procedural er-
rors in the course of the hearing, because the union failed to
provide adequate representation, or for both reasons. The Vaca
requirement that the individual must make a threshold showing
of unfair representation and then must submit his contract claim
for full adjudication by the court, fails to consider the unique
circumstances of post-award challenges to the arbitration pro-
cess. As an alternative model, this Comment suggests that the
employee should be allowed to attack an adverse award on any
of the substantive and procedural grounds now available to em-
ployers and unions, as well as on the ground that a breach of the
duty of fair representation has vitiated the fairness of the arbi-
tration process. The underlying contract claim should not be
litigated in the courts but should rather be remanded for re-
arbitration.
6 0 d. at 196-97.
6"Id. at 196.
6 2
1d.
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A. Practical Considerations
Because only the union and not the individual employee
may invoke the arbitration procedure, unfair representation de-
prives the individual of the opportunity to vindicate his contrac-
tual right. In the pre-award setting, therefore, the unfair rep-
resentation suit against the union guarantees that the individual
employee will not be totally deprived of a forum to air his griev-
ance. After an award is issued, however, the employee's griev-
ance has been heard by an arbitrator, and the inquiry should
then focus on whether that hearing was fair and adequate. At
this point, misconduct on the part of either or both the arbi-
trator and the union may have tainted the outcome of the arbi-
tration. As a pre-arbitral case, Vaca did not consider the possibil-
ity of error by the arbitrator and therefore does not determine
the procedure and the remedy applicable to employee attacks on
arbitral awards. Although the Vaca model, in which the court
adjudicates the merits of the underlying grievance after a thres-
hold showing of unfair representation has been made, has been
applied extensively to post-award cases, 63 there are compelling
reasons not to do so.
Because the various grounds for an employer or union chal-
lenge to the arbitrator's award are usually unavailable to him, the
individual employee is forced under an extension of the Vaca
model to institute a fair representation suit in order to challenge
the award, even when his real ground of attack is that the arbi-
trator exceeded the scope of his authority or failed to give the
grievant a fair hearing. The initial necessity of proving unfair
representation may effectively foreclose such an attack in two
rather different cases. In the first instance, the requirement of a
threshold showing of unfair representation will operate to bar
completely the challenge of an individual employee who has suf-
fered an adverse award, not because his union failed to repre-
sent him adequately, but simply because the arbitrator commit-
ted a substantive or procedural error. If the employee may at-
tack the arbitral award when his union has provided inadequate
representation, he should be entitled to raise a similar challenge
when only the arbitrator's misconduct has undermined the
award's validity. 64 In the second case, where both the arbitrator
and the union are at fault, requiring the employee to institute
" See, e.g., Hines v. Anchor Motor Freight, Inc., 424 U.S. 554 (1976); Margetta v.
Pam Pam Corp., 501 F.2d 179 (9th Cir. 1974).
'4 See text accompanying note 85 infra.
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and succeed in a fair representation suit before he can vindicate
his contractual right, compels him to sue his own union, even
though the arbitrator's errors exist as an independent and suffi-
cient ground for challenging the award. The employee may
forego the challenge rather than risk antagonizing his union.
The contractual rights of the employee in both situations
can be more adequately protected by allowing him to challenge
the award on the basis of any of the substantive or procedural
grounds currently available to employers and unions. The right
to be represented fairly may be viewed as a separate ground for
attacking the award-a ground necessitated by the guarantee of
procedural due process, which requires that all material evidence
be presented by the union and considered by the arbitrator.
65 If
an employee may attack the arbitrator's errors without having to
allege a breach of the union's duty of fair representation, he may
structure his attack to address the particular defect in the arbi-
tration process that he wishes to challenge. When the arbitrator
alone has erred substantively or procedurally, the employee
need not prove any unfair representation by the union and is
therefore not compelled to manufacture allegations of union
misconduct, however tenuous, in order to satisfy this threshold
requirement.6 6 The grievant thus avoids the psychologically and
politically awkward position of suing the union that will continue
to represent him after the litigation. Furthermore, the em-
ployee's hopes of prevailing in his challenge to the award are
improved because union officers and fellow union members who
may have evidence relating to the arbitrator's errors are more
likely to step forward if the union is not implicated. 67 In cases
where the union has not represented the employee adequately
but where the arbitrator's conduct has not independently vitiated
the award, the employee has no choice but to attack the union
6-But cf. Hines v. Anchor Motor Freight, Inc., 424 U.S. 554, 573-76 (1976) (Rehn-
quist, J., dissenting) (the union's duty of fair representation does not extend to its con-
duct in the arbitration hearing, once the union has decided to submit the grievance to
arbitration).
66 It has been suggested that the union's duty of fair representation should be ex-
panded to demand fairness in deciding whether to challenge an adverse award. See
Tobias, supra note 7, at 539. Although such a suggestion may be a worthwhile reform
within the framework of Vaca, a basic problem remains: the individual employee is still
compelled to sue his own union in order to have his contractual claim vindicated. He
would have to prove both that the award was invalid and that the union abused its
discretion in declining to challenge the award. This problem can be remedied only by
distinguishing between a challenge to an arbitral award that attacks the arbitrator's er-
rors and one that is grounded on the union's breach of the duty of fair representation.6 7See id. 545-50.
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under the procedures suggested by Vaca and its progeny. In
appropriate cases, however, the suggested model for employee
challenges to arbitral awards may have the advantage of permit-
ting the employee to accommodate a desire to vindicate his con-
tractual rights with a desire to maintain unstrained relations with
his union. The benefits of not actually naming the union as a
defendant and forcing it to justify publicly its presentation of the
case may significantly protect the union's credibility and repu-
tation in the eyes of both the employer and the general mem-
bership.
68
B. Procedural Considerations
When an individual has succeeded in proving that he was
inadequately represented by the union, courts following Vaca
have generally adjudicated the merits of the underlying griev-
ance rather than ordering the dispute to arbitration. 69 Although
Vaca suggests that either of these procedures may be appro-
priate,7 0 their differences are significant and the choice be-
tween them requires a comparison of the interests involved. This
Comment concludes that in the post-award context, a remand
for rearbitration is the preferable method of resolving the un-
derlying grievance, regardless of whether the award was tainted
by unfair representation or by the arbitrator's error.
When the union's breach of its duty of fair representation
has occurred prior to the issuance of an award, adjudication of
the contractual claim by the court may better insure that the
individual's grievance will receive a fair hearing. Ordering the
union to arbitration after a pre-arbitral finding of unfair rep-
resentation places the union in an untenable position: on the one
hand, it is responsible for fairly and aggressively representing
the grievant, while on the other, it is tempted to present an
inadequate, perhaps even a losing case, in order to vindicate its
68 Under the procedural reform suggested by this Comment, the decision whether
to force the union to defend its actions in the arbitration hearing is effectively shifted
from the individual employee to the employer. If the employee chooses not to name
the union in his challenge to the award, and if some evidence that the union breached
its duty of fair representation is available to the employer, he is then confronted with
the difficult decision whether to implead the union on the issue of damages. This pos-
sibility raises two intriguing questions: (1) can the employer, as opposed to the em-
ployee, assert that the union breached its duty of fair representation as a technique of
compelling the union to pay some share of the damages that may be awarded to the
employee; (2) is the benefit of impleading the union outweighed by the hostility toward
the employer that is likely to result?
69 See note 10 supra.
71 386 U.S. at 196.
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original decision that the grievance lacked merit. Even if the
individual is permitted to intervene with private counsel, the
union's conflict of interest remains, and may be aggravated by
the presence of a nonunion attorney. In spite of the clear judicial
policy favoring internal dispute resolution through arbitration,'
1
adjudication of the merits is probably preferable when the court
cannot effectively insure the fairness of any arbitration that it
might order.
In the post-award context, however, the potential for rear-
bitration to provide a fair hearing is significantly greater. Al-
though the union's initial presentation may have been less than
zealous, if its conduct has not been challenged and if the award
has been vacated on grounds other than unfair representation,
the union has suffered no loss of face and it may be more asser-
tive in representing the grievant at the rearbitration. Guidance
for effective representation may derive from any procedural or-
ders the court has issued to prevent error by the arbitrator, and
from the language of the court's opinion.
Even when a finding of unfair representation has been
made, the power of a court to insure fairness in the rearbitration
is greater than in the pre-arbitral setting.7 2 Because it has access
to the record of the initial arbitration, the court can discover
specific deficiencies in the union's presentation and may fashion
a remedial order precisely tailored to adducing particular evi-
dence, testimony, or arguments. By contrast, when the union has
refused to process the grievance to arbitration, an order to arbi-
trate.cannot address any specific dangers and may contain only
an abstract admonition of fairness and good faith. The post-
award context also affords the union a ready opportunity to save
face by attributing the unfairness to the misconduct or inexperi-
ence of the particular advocate who initially presented the case.
The respectability of the entire process of evaluating grievances
may thus be salvaged through a means unavailable where a
grievance has been unfairly abandoned prior to arbitration. The
union need never depart from its institutional posture of sup-
porting the grievant and it may preserve its credibility by provid-
ing a competent and forceful advocate in the rearbitration.
If specific orders by the court can provide guidelines for a
fair rearbitration, and if the union's ambivalence about the result
can be minimized, several advantages of the suggested proce-
71 See text accompanying notes 12-18 supra.
72 The court retains jurisdiction over the rearbitration to insure compliance with its
orders and a result "not inconsistent with" its opinion.
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dure outweigh any remaining dangers. All litigants involved may
find the procedure attractive because only the threshold ques-
tion whether grounds exist for vacating the award must be liti-
gated, thus avoiding a costly and protracted trial of the merits of
the underlying claim. These issues, of course, are often inter-
twined; for example, if the grievant claims that the union acted
unfairly by failing to introduce certain evidence or that the arbi-
trator improperly refused to consider it, the court must then
examine the totality of the evidence to determine whether the
omission was prejudicial to the employee's case. The court, how-
ever, will not scrutinize such evidence to determine whether the
grievant would have in fact prevailed, but will rather decide
whether the missing evidence is material-that is, would have
been relevant to a reasonable and impartial arbitrator's deci-
sion. 73 If grounds for overturning the award are found, the
parties then face a relatively less expensive and more familiar
rearbitration proceeding,74 and in some cases, vacating the
award may effectively resolve the underlying merits. 75 If the
award is allowed to stand, litigation of the contractual claim will
be avoided and the union will not be tempted to prove the em-
ployer's case against its own member.
Finally, the procedure for ordering rearbitration after vacat-
ing an award may preserve the grievant's fundamental right to
have his grievance heard by an arbitrator. The value of this right
lies in the standards of decision used by most arbitrators, who,
for example, will generally require a strong showing of just cause
and appropriate sanction in discharge and discipline cases, and
will often consider the grievant's past record in mitigation of the
penalty imposed by the employer.
76
The grievant will also prefer a hearing before an arbitrator
rather than before a judge because a judge is likely to be un-
familiar with the ongoing relationship of the parties and the law
73 See text accompanying note 36 supra.
71 Arbitration proceedings are considered more economical than litigation in the
courts. See Jalet,Judicial Review of Arbitration: The Judicial Attitude, 45 CORNELL L.Q. 519,
521-23 (1960). This advantage of the model is vitiated if the fairness of the rearbitra-
tion is impaired, necessitating subsequent judicial involvement, although this problem
could be avoided by any number of methods that insure a fair hearing in the rearbitra-
tion. See text accompanying notes 115-17 infra.
" The mere vacating of an award could dictate the ultimate resolution of the
merits where, for example, the court found the arbitrator's interpretation of the collec-
tive agreement to be inconsistent with its unambiguous meaning. The new arbitrator's
role would then in effect be limited to designing a remedy for the grievant.
76 Tobias, A Plea for the Wrongfully Discharged Employee Abandoned by His Union, 41 U.
GON. L. REV. 55, 56-57, 79 (1972).
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of the shop. The discretion vested in the arbitrator to consider a
number of factors that might be inadmissible in a court of law is
precisely the leavening of equity anticipated by the Steelworkers
Trilogy. The substitution of a judge's interpretation of the con-
tract for that of an arbitrator is just the kind of formal and
uninformed dispute resolution that the Steelworkers Trilogy was
intended to preclude.
C. Policy Considerations
The model for expanding the grounds upon which an indi-
vidual employee may challenge an adverse award raises a
number of problems, despite the benefits that accrue to the em-
ployee. The first consideration requires an examination of the
authority that will give an individual employee standing to chal-
lenge the award. The second consideration examines to what
extent the recognition of standing undermines the union's pres-
tige as the exclusive bargaining agent.
1. The Problem of Standing
The model proposed in this Comment might be challenged
on the ground that the individual grievant has no standing to
challenge an arbitral award except when the union violates the
duty of fair representation. This view is usually based on the
assumption that the employee is not a party to the collective
agreement which typically limits use of the grievance procedure
to only the union and the employer. 77 In the pre-arbitral con-
text, literal adherence to such contractual language may be jus-
tified by the union's need to control the administration of the
collective agreement and to decide which grievances are suffi-
ciently meritorious to warrant arbitration. Judge Fuld elucidated
this consideration in his concurring opinion in Parker v. Borock,78
an early New York case typifying the reasoning of courts that
deny the individual standing to compel arbitration:
Discharge cases arise in the course of the administra-
tion of a collective bargaining agreement. They may raise
countless questions, such as interpretation of the agree-
ment, reasonableness of plant rules and regulations and
"7See, e.g., Black-Clawson Co. v. International Ass'n of Machinists, 313 F.2d 179
(2d Cir. 1962); Cortez v. Ford Motor Co., 349 Mich. 108, 84 N.W.2d 523 (1957); cf.
Black v. USM Corp., 94 L.R:R.M, 2509 (D.N.H. 1977) (American Arbitration Associa-
tion rule permitting any party to the arbitration to be represented by counsel held not
applicable to an individual employee, who is not considered a party to the proceeding).
78 5 N.Y.2d 156, 182 N.Y.S.2d 577, 156 N.E.2d 297 (1959).
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conformity with past practices. The exclusive representa-
tive is in the best position, after investigating the truth and
merits of the employee's complaint and after weighing the
many factors involved, to determine whether uniformity
in the administration of the agreement and protection of
the group interests of the majority of employees require it
to press or abandon the case.
79
Although the argument for union control may be compel-
ling before an award has been rendered, ° courts do not rely on it
in post-award cases, but instead retreat into mere formalism to
defiy standing to an individual employee who challenges an ar-
bitral award. In In re Soto, 8 1 the New York Court of Appeals held
that individual employees could not challenge an award under
the Civil Practice Act because:
[t]he misconduct of an arbitrator, contemplated by the
statute, and warranting the setting aside of an award, is
that "by which the rights of any party have been prej-
udiced." The petitioners, not being parties to the agree-
ment, may not avail themselves of rights which under the
Civil Practice Act are limited to parties .... 82
The court offered no rationale for its narrow construction of the
term "party," rejecting the notion that the employee's relation-
ship to the collective agreement is that of a third party ben-
eficiary, a premise upon which the lower court had granted the
individual standing to challenge the award.
83
Denial of the individual's standing to challenge an award has
also been accomplished by resorting to a literal reading of con-
tractual language that makes the arbitrator's decision final and
binding on both the individual and collective parties. The defini-
tion of "party" under an arbitration clause should not, however,
determine whether the grievant has standing under section
301(a) of the LMRA to enforce his contractual rights. The un-
79Id. at 162, 182 N.Y.S.2d at 581-82, 156 N.E.2d at 300 (Fuld, J., concurring). The
opinion's focus on discharge cases is obviously not essential; the conflict between indi-
vidual and collective interests may arise whenever any personal right is at issue.
"°But see Vaca v. Sipes, 386 U.S. 171, 203-10 (1967) (Black, J., dissenting).
81 7 N.Y.2d 397, 198 N.Y.S.2d 282, 165 N.E.2d 855 (1960).
82 Id. at 399, 198 N.Y.S.2d at 283, 165 N.E.2d at 856 (citation omitted).
83 Id. The Borock decision, on the other hand, adopted the third-party beneficiary
theory but interpreted it to permit only a suit against the union for breach of its
fiduciary duty. 5 N.Y.2d at 161-62, 182 N.Y.S.2d at 580-81, 156 N.E.2d at 299-300. See
also Acuff v. United Papermakers and Paperworkers, 404 F.2d 169, 171 n.2 (5th Cir.
1968) (under the Arbitration Act), cert. denied, 394 U.S. 987 (1969), where the court
read "party" narrowly to include only the collective parties.
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derlying premise of the Smith-Maddox-Vaca line of cases is that an
individual employee does have standing, subject to the require-
ment that he first exhaust his remedies under the grievance
procedure.
4
These cases did not resolve the question whether exhaustion
of the grievance procedure and the issuance of an award extin-
guishes the individual's right to enforce the collective bargaining
agreement. This Comment suggests that he does retain that
right when the grievance procedure is tainted by procedural
unfairness or gross substantive error.85 If the finality principle of
the Steelworkers Trilogy does not preclude challenges by the em-
ployer or the union, it should not preclude similar attacks by
individual employees on the fairness of the arbitration process.8"
Vaca demonstrated that an employee can seek judicial enforce-
ment of his contractual rights when the effectiveness of the
grievance procedure has been undermined by the union's mis-
conduct, but Vaca does not address and cannot be read to pro-
hibit attacks on the process if it has been vitiated by the arbitra-
tor's errors. The mere existence of a tainted arbitral award
should not destroy the employee's standing under section 301 (a)
unless collective interests outweigh the interest of the employee
in protecting his rights after an arbitration.
2. Balancing Individual and Collective
Interests
The union's responsibility to consider the needs of its entire
membership arises whenever a grievance is filed. The potential
for conflict between the collective interests and those of the indi-
vidual exists whenever the grievance involves the enforcement of
a personal right.8 7 The risk of giving individual employees stand-
ing to challenge arbitration awards under section 301(a) is that
any arbitral award adversely affecting an employee's rights could
4 Rogers v. Allied Aviation Serv. Co., 49 L.R.R.M. 2287 (S.D.N.Y. 1961), on motion
to set aside the judgment, 50 L.R.R.M. 2514, 2516 (S.D.N.Y. 1962), aff'd per curiam, 315
F.2d 513 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 375 U.S. 847 (1963).
8See Vaca v. Sipes, 386 U.S. 171, 199-201 (1967) (Fortas, J., concurring in the
result); id. at 203-10 (Black, J., dissenting).86 The finality of the arbitration process was further questioned in Vaca by the
Court's suggestion that it should hear the merits of the § 30 1(a) claim. If the Vaca Court
had wanted to preserve the arbitration process as the final method of resolving contrac-
tual disputes, it could have ordered that grievances generally should be remanded for
arbitration. Instead, the lower courts were left the option to order arbitration or to hear
the contract claim themselves. Id. at 195-96.
17 See note 5 supra.
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be attacked by that employee, irrespective of whether the collec-
tive interests were advanced by the award. Even if the union
genuinely supports the position of a particular employee but
suffers an adverse arbitral award, the union might legitimately
choose not to appeal the award out of a concern for the collec-
tive interests. If the union is in the process of negotiating a new
contract, for example, the political costs of challenging the award
might very well exceed the benefits of winning that particular
case. Whether the union's discretion to balance collective and
individual interests would be seriously undermined by expand-
ing the grounds for employee attacks on arbitral awards depends
upon both the quantity and the quality of the challenges that
would be permitted under the proposed model.
The quantitative burden imposed by the model will be miti-
gated by three factors: the scope of an employee's standing to
attack an award, the effect of a very limited scope of judicial
review to discourage frivolous claims, and the actual number of
grievances resulting in awards adverse to the interests of the
employee. First, for a plaintiff to have standing to challenge an
award, the award must have adversely affected his individual
rights under the collective agreement.8 8 Dismissal of suits by
plaintiffs who lack any colorable interest in the award or who
assert collective rather than personal rights will diminish the
number of challenges that must be litigated. Second, because an
employee's attack on an adverse arbitration award is subject to
the limited scrutiny applied to employer and union challenges,89
frivolous claims will be dismissed under the standards imposed
by the Steelworkers Trilogy."° The costliness and the potentially
limited success of this type of claim may discourage the disgrun-
tled employee who challenges an arbitral award simply to harass
the union. Third, under the existing system, only a very few
grievances ever reach an arbitrator and an even smaller number
of awards are likely to be attacked. The number of challenges
heard by the courts will probably be small. 91
Of greater significance in evaluating the model's impact is
the issue of its effect on the union's status as the exclusive rep-
8 8 See note 5 supra.
89 See text accomqunying notes 23-33 supra.
"' See text accompanying notes 36-39 supra.
91 See Feller, A General Theory of the Collective Bargaining Agreement, 61 CAL L. REv.
663, 754 (1973). Feller reports that the arbitrators for General Motors heard less than 100
cases per year between 1940 and 1958. In 1957, only 24 out of 80,000 grievances pro-
cessed by the UAW in GM plants were heard and decided by the arbitrators. Id.
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resentative. The argument against expanding the grounds of
individual challenges is that the employees, by voting in favor of
the collective agreement negotiated by the union, have bar-
gained for the arbitral process and, consequently, must abide by
an adverse award. To allow employees to challenge arbitration
awards permits them to circumvent the binding process of dis-
pute resolution negotiated by their exclusive representative.
9 2
This argument could be refuted by noting that neither the em-
ployer nor the union are irrevocably bound by the arbitral
award; 93 more fundamentally, granting standing to employees
strikes a viable balance between the needs of the individual and
those of the collective union membership.
It can be argued that the union should be permitted to
decide whether to appeal an adverse award because the union is
responsible for balancing the interests of the membership and
those of the individual employee. This balancing, however,
should occur prior to the decision to submit a grievance to arbi-
tration and the union should be discouraged from pressing to
arbitration claims which it views as unmeritorious or inconsistent
with the collective interest, merely to foreclose a suit for breach
of the duty of fair representation.94 If the union has sought
arbitration it should continue to support the grievance aggres-
sively after an adverse award has been rendered. The union may
properly decide not to challenge the award only when it fairly
decides that the best interest of its membership does not justify
further expense to pursue the grievance, or that the needs of the
collective have been strengthened by circumstances subsequent
to the decision to arbitrate.9 5 The model suggested in this Com-
ment will not damage a union that has acted fairly prior to the
arbitration but has refused to appeal for either of these reasons.
The expense of the employee's attack will not be borne by the
entire union membership, and if the union has in good faith
altered its evaluation of the grievance, the propriety of its new
position will be relevant to deciding whether the award should
be overturned. If the union has legitimately concluded that the
result is inconsistent with a balancing of interests permissible
under the collective agreement, a court is unlikely to view the
9
2 See id. at 740-45.
3 See text accompanying notes 85-87 supra.
91 An arbitral award should add no special gloss of finality to a union's justifiable
position. See note 101 infra.
15 A discussion of improper reasons for sacrificing an individual's claim may be
found in the text accompanying notes 98-101 infra.
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award as tainted or grossly erroneous. Even if the award is va-
cated, the union retains the right at rearbitration to argue for a
nuanced interpretation of the contract that will balance the col-
lective and individual interests. This model seeks to redress the
employee's injuries in precisely those instances when the union
has acted unfairly in procuring the arbitral award or in refusing
to challenge it.
IV. APPLICATION OF THE MODEL TO
THE "RIGGED" AWARD
The usefulness of the model suggested in this Comment
may be examined by applying it to a situation that often
threatens the rights of the individual grievant-the "rigged"
award.9 6 A rigged or orchestrated award is rendered when the
union agrees with the company either overtly or tacitly that a
result adverse to the interests of the grievant should flow from
the arbitration. This sentiment is then communicated explicitly
or implicitly by the union's actions and arguments to the arbi-
trator, who will tailor his award accordinglyf 7 Although the ar-
bitration process can provide the individual with a fair and sym-
pathetic adjudication of his contractual rights, the process is
virtually useless to the individual if the award is rigged to meet
the needs of the company and the union.
A union may orchestrate an award for a variety of reasons:
it may wish to curry favor with the employer or may feel that the
grievant's case, though meritorious, is too trivial to risk disrupt-
ing the employer-union relationship; it may be antagonistic to
the grievant for political reasons if, for example, the grievant has
criticized union officials or opposed their actions; 98 it may wish
to alter the effective meaning of a contract clause prior to formal
renegotiation by obtaining the arbitrator's imprimatur on a par-
ticular contractual interpretation; 99 or it may have agreed with
the employer not to press the employee's grievance in exchange
for a concession by the employer on another issue." ' In any of
96 For a general discussion of the problems of rigged awards, see Epstein, The
"Agreed" Case: A Problem in Ethics, 20 ARB. J. 41 (1965); Fleming, Some Problems of Due
Process and Fair Procedure in Labor Arbitration, 13 STAN. L. REV. 235, 248-51 (1961).
97See Fuller, Collective Bargaining and the Arbitrator, 1963 Wis. L. REv. 3, 20-22.
""See, e.g., Holodnak v. Avco Corp., 381 F. Sipp. 191 (D. Conn. 1974), aff'd in part
and rev'd in part, 514 F.2d 285 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 892 (1975) (employee
published an article critical of company and union practices).
""See Summers, The Individual Employee's Rights Under the Collective Agreement: What
Constitutes Fair Representation, NATIONAL ACADEMY OF ARBITRATORS, ARBITRATION-1974
PROCEEDINGS, 27TH ANNUAL MEETING 14, 24 (1975).
""'Id. 27-28.
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these situations, the union may decide to proceed with the arbi-
tration simply to forestall a charge of the failure to provide ade-
quate representation, but it will orchestrate the award or provide
an ineffective advocacy so that an adverse decision will result.'
Although the union should have broad discretion to settle griev-
ances in a non-discriminatory manner,' 1 2 as well as to advocate
reasonable but consistently applied interpretations of ambiguous
contract provisions,1 3 its arrangement of a rigged award un-
doubtedly makes the arbitration process a sham for the indi-
vidual grievant. The question is whether the proposed model
can be useful in this context to the individual who attacks such
an award.
A. The Challenge
The individual whose contractual rights are compromised
by the rigged award is damaged both by the actions of the union
and by the arbitrator's acquiesence in the orchestration. The
model suggested in this Comment exposes the arbitrator's award
to an attack by the employee regardless of whether he chooses to
challenge the union's representation of his grievance. Although
the rigged award involves some breach of the union's duty of
fair representation, proving that the union was actually respon-
sible for the adverse award is a difficult task for the individual.
Even if he is willing to sue his own union, the grievant may have
no way of proving that the union expressly arranged for the
adverse result, and the union's failure to advocate the employee's
position fully and forcefully may not violate the duty of fair
representation." The union's behavior would, in fact, appear
totally proper in cases where an arbitrator had overtly agreed in
'" Many arbitrations are perfunctorily prosecuted by unions, or orchestrated, when
the union honestly believes that the company's position is correct but fears that the
employee will bring an unfair representation suit if the grievance is not brought to
arbitration. The processing of the grievance through an arbitration that the union plans
to lose is an expedient way of discouraging a challenge to the resulting award because
under the present system, the individual employee may challenge the award only if he
can prove that the union acted in bad faith. See Koretz & Rabin, Arbitration and Individual
Rights, THE FUTURE OF LABOR ARBITRATION IN AMERICA, 135 n.91 (1976).
To the extent that the union exercises good judgment and good faith, as pre-
scribed by Vaca, in determining that a grievance lacks merit, the union should be en-
couraged to settle the grievance at the earliest stage of the procedure rather than to
burden the employer and the rest of the union membership with expensive and uneces-
sary arbitrations. The individual employee may still test the union's judgment in a pre-
arbitral fair representation suit.
12"See Vaca v. Sipes, 386 U.S. 171, 192 (1967).
,'3 See Summers, supra note 99, at 31.
,o4 See text accompanying notes 54-55 supra.
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advance that he would deny the grievance, even after hearing
full and meritorious arguments to the contrary by the union.
105
Although this sort of conduct is generally condemned and dis-
avowed by professional arbitrators, the arbitrator's acquiesence
in a rigged award may result from the fundamental fact that he
is dependent for his livelihood on his acceptability to the parties
who hire him. 10 6 These parties, of course, are the employer and
the union. In such an employment relationship, the arbitrator's
incentive to protect the individual's rights may be outweighed by
his temptation to conform to the wishes of the employer and the
union. 
1 0
7
A right to attack the arbitral award on any ground presently
available to the employer or the union permits the individual
employee to have the award vacated by proving any substantive
or procedural error committed by the arbitrator in the context
of a rigged award. In contrast to the requirements for proving
unfair representation, which force the employee to challenge
publicly the union's exercise of discretion and the quality of rep-
resentation it provides its members, the standards for measur-
ing error by the arbitrator are objective and fairly well-defined,
and they can be met by reference to written records, agreements,
and precedent.1 118 When, for example, the issue before the arbi-
trator involves interpretation of the collective agreement, the
award might be inconsistent with the clear meaning of the con-
tractual language or with the established past practice of the
parties. When just cause for discipline is at issue, the arbitral
award might uphold the company's treatment of the particular
individual, even though the arbitrator knew or had reason to
know that similarly situated employees had been treated more
leniently. The arbitrator's knowledge of past practices and cases
could be proved by showing that evidence of such cases had in
fact been submitted by the union or even that the arbitrator had
reached incompatible decisions in similar cases between the par-
ties. Arbitral awards of this sort could be vacated due to evidence
"" See Wirtz, Due Process of Arbitration, NATIONAL ACADEMY OF ARBrrRATORS, THE
ARBITRATOR AND THE PARTIES, PROCEEDINGS, 11TH ANNUAL MEETING 1, 27 (1958).
1 6 Raffaele, Needed: A Fourth Party in Industrial Relations, 13 LAB. L.J. 230, 236, 238
(1962). As demonstrated in Holodnak, 381 F. Supp. at 198-99, the arbitrator is particu-
larly likely to develop a sense of identification with the interests of the employer and
the union when he is their permanent arbitrator.
107 For suggested solutions to this problem, see Koretz & Rabin, supra note 101 at
143-47; Summers, supra note 99 at 30-3 1.
"'s For a discussion of the application of these standards in employer and union
challenges, see text accompanying notes 23-37 supra.
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of the arbitrator's bias in his failure to apply known decisional
standards in an even-handed fashion. The rigged award could
be challenged on substantive grounds when a court finds that
the award did not derive its essence from the collective agree-
ment or that the award represented an interpretation of a provi-
sion contrary to its unambiguous meaning." 9 The crux of the
substantive challenge is that the arbitrator is exceeding his au-
thority under the contract; such abuse exists when he effectively
renegotiates the agreement.
A more troublesome problem faces the grievant where the
award has been rigged without the knowledge or cooperation of
the arbitrator. The union can accomplish this even without the
complicity of the employer in several ways: the union may with-
hold material facts and compelling arguments, or it may contend
for an interpretation of a concededly ambiguous contract provi-
sion that is opposite from the one it urged in prior arbitrations.
Under these circumstances, because the arbitral award will have
no facial defects, the individual will have little choice but to at-
tack it on the ground that the union represented him unfairly.
Even in a fair representation suit, however, the employee may
benefit from the standards that presently govern attacks on
awards by employers and unions because these standards may,
by analogy, illuminate the important but unresolved question of
what constitutes a breach of the duty of fair representation."', A
grievant might establish such a breach, for example, by produc-
ing material evidence that the union possessed but failed to
introduce or by noting favorable arguments or techniques of
cross-examination that were omitted. These omissions might be
indicative of the union's failure to represent the grievant in good
faith under the same standard that finds an arbitrator's bias in
his failure to hear material evidence or to apply known and
settled law to the facts before him. Like the arbitrator who ex-
ceeds the scope of his authority by issuing an award that is in-
consistent with the express terms of the contract, the union in
such cases has deprived the individual of a fair hearing if it
contends for such a result. Application of the same standards
that govern challenges to awards brought by employers and
unions to challenges brought by individuals permits the court to
"9 See text accompanying notes 23-30 supra.
I" See Vaca v. Sipes, 386 U.S. 171, 203 (1967) (Fortas, J., concurring), where Mr.
Justice Fortas described as "amorphous" the standards for deciding what constitutes
unfair representation. For a thoughtful judicial attempt at defining fair respresentation,
see Griffin v. UAW, 469 F.2d 181 (4th Cir. 1972).
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define unfair representation in reference to a set of objective
standards that have been established in the parties' prior deal-
ings. By comparison, the standards enunciated in Vaca require
an evaluation of a union's conduct to determine whether it com-
ports with the court's conception of fairness, 11' although such a
standard might not accurately consider the nature of the collec-
tive parties' prior relationship.
B. Issues on Remand
The proposed model contemplates that after an award is
vacated, the judge will ordinarily remand the underlying griev-
ance for rearbitration before the same or a different arbitrator,
depending upon whether the grounds for vacating the award
involve misconduct on the part of the arbitrator. The rationale
of the remand procedure is that it preserves both the integrity of
the internal grievance procedure and the anticipated contractual
right to have a conflict resolved by arbitration. Because the re-
mand procedure is common after a successful employer or
union attack on an award, a court should likewise order rearbi-
tration when the employee has challenged the arbitrator's author-
ity or impartiality." 2 Under a theory that allows the individual
employee to enforce his contractual rights after the grievance
procedure has been exhausted, any liability for damages that
follows a successful challenge to the arbitral award should be
imposed on the employer whose conduct caused the abridg-
ment of those rights and who would have incurred full damage
liability if the union had exercised its prerogative and success-
fully challenged the award.1 13 If no breach of the duty of fair
representation is proven, no liability can justifiably be imposed
on the union because it has fulfilled its contractual obligations to
the employee.
'1 4
When evidence exists of both the arbitrator's error and the
union's unfair representation, however, certain safeguards are
needed to insure that the second arbitration will be fair and that
"See 386 U.S. at 190-91.
112 See text accompanying note 115 infra.
" Cf. Acme Fast Freight, Inc., 37 Lab. Arb. Rep. 163, 166 (1961) (delay in holding
initial arbitration not attributable to union or employee did not reduce employer's liabil-
ity for back pay).
114 Having fulfilled its contractual responsibility to the grievant, the union should
not be required to provide or reimburse counsel in the second arbitration proceeding.
The individual employee will probably have to bear this burden himself because no
attorney's fees can be awarded against the employer. See Scott v. Anchor Motor Freight,
Inc., 496 F.2d 276, 281-82 (6th Cir. 1974); but see District 50, UMW v. Bowman
Transp., Inc., 421 F.2d 934, 935 (5th Cir. 1970) (per curiam).
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damages will be properly assessed. The court may handle the
fairness problem by retaining jurisdiction over the rearbitration
and by issuing procedural instructions that insure the full and
fair hearing anticipated by the collective agreement. Any of the
following orders may be appropriate: that the hearing will be
held before a different arbitrator and the individual will have a
voice in his selection; 1 15 that the grievant will have the right to
intervene in the hearing through his own counsel, whose reason-
able fees will be paid by the union; 1 6 that particular excluded
evidence will be proffered and admitted for consideration by the
arbitrator." 1
7
The assessment of damages in cases where unfair represen-
tation has been shown is more complicated," 8 but the court may
simply order that if the employee wins in the rearbitration, any
damages shall be apportioned in accordance with the court's
instructions." 9 The employer should be held liable for all loss of
pay and benefits that occurred up to the date of the initial arbi-
tration hearing, 2" but Vaca suggests that damages beyond that
date must be apportioned between the union and the company
according to the fault of each.1'2 When no overt collusion be-
tween the employer and the union has been shown, the court
may reasonably assume that but for the union's breach of the
duty of fair representation the grievant would have been fully
redressed at the first hearing and it may therefore impose all
liability on the union from that date forward. 22 Alternatively,
the court may, under its retained jurisdiction over the con-
troversy, apportion damages after the arbitral decision on
liability.'
2 3
"'See Koretz & Rabin, supra note 101, at 149.
1 'See Tobias, supra note 7, at 552-53. Cf. Scott v. Teamsters Local 377, 548 F.2d
1244 (6th Cir. 1977) (per curiam) (the award of attorney's fees against the union for an
employee's § 301(a) suit against the employer held valid).
"1See Harvey Aluminum (Inc.) v. United Steelworkers, 263 F. Supp. 488 (C.D.
Cal. 1967).
See generally Tobias, supra note 7, at 550-53.
, The alternative of having the arbitrator determine the award of damages is not
available because collective agreements are almost certain to lack any provision granting
the arbitrator authority to assess damages against the union. See Vaca v. Sipes, 386 U.S.
171, 196 (1967).
12,1 Hines v. Anchor Motor Freight, Inc., 424 U.S. 554, 561-72 (1976); Vaca v.
Sipes, 386 U.S. 171, 195-98 (1967).
121 386 U.S. at 197-98.
122 Discussion of this theory is found in Feller, supra note 91, at 822-23.
122 This may well be the most desirable method in cases where punitive damages
are appropriate. The propriety of such damage awards in suits joining for representa-
tion and § 301 claims is discussed by the Second Circuit in Holodnak v. Avco Corp.,
514 F.2d 285, 291-93 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 892 (1975).
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V. CONCLUSION
The problems of protecting individual rights under a collec-
tive bargaining agreement are "rooted in the need for reconcil-
ing the interests of the individual with the collective interests of
the union and management.' 1 24 This Comment has offered a
model for balancing those interests in the post-award setting
under a single procedure that can be effective when those in-
terests are either competitive or complementary. The model also
affords the individual greater flexibility in choosing grounds for
attacking an arbitral award, and it may allow the employee to
vindicate his contractual claim without antagonizing his union.
Recognizing the value of the arbitration process in resolving
industrial disputes, the model further seeks to assure that both
the collective parties and individual employees will receive their
justly expected benefits of that process. The procedure of rear-
bitrating the employee's contractual claim permits the parties to
the collective agreement to resolve their conflicts internally. The
collective parties are not compelled to permit a public tribunal to
dictate the substantive rules of their relationship, but rather they
may expect the specialized knowledge and experience of an ar-
bitrator to determine the case.
In situations where an employee's grievance has not yet
been considered by an arbitrator, the employee should appro-
priately look first to the union to protect his contractual rights,
and he should institute a fair representation suit if the union's
misconduct vitiates the effectiveness of the negotiated grievance
procedure. When, however, the grievance has been processed
through arbitration, the fairness of the result may be tainted
by either the union's misconduct or the arbitrator's errors. In
neither case should the grievant's rights remain unvindicated.
Under the model suggested in this Comment, the damage to the
employee's rights can be repaired fully and effectively while re-
taining the advantages inherent in the system of arbitration.
124 Summers, Individual Rights in Collective Agreements: A Preliminary Analysis, 9 BUFF.
L. REv. 239, 241 (1960).
